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An aggregate integrated assessment model is used to investigate the relative merits of hedging over the near term against the 
chance that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide will be limited as a matter of global policy. Hedging strategies are eval- 
uated given near term uncertainty about the targeted level of limited concentrations and the trajectory of future carbon emissions. 
All uncertainty is resolved in the year 2020, and strategies that minimize the expected discounted value of the long term cost of 
abatement, including the extra cost of adjusting downstream to meet unexpected concentration limits along unanticipated emis- 
sion trajectories, are identified. Even with uncertainties that span current wisdom on emission futures and restriction thresholds 
that run from 550 ppm through 850 ppm, the results offer support for at most modest abatement response over the next several 
decades to the threat of global change. 
1 Int roduct ion 
Armed with a preliminary but growing understanding 
of the potential damage that might result from green- 
house warming, researchers have begun systematically 
to weigh the potential benefits of emissions abatement 
strategies against their anticipated cost. Sixteen of the 
twenty-three distinct integrated assessment models iden- 
tified in the most recent report of Working Group III of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [4] are 
designed to do just that; and most of them base their 
results on specifications of damage functions that typi- 
cally associate a 2.5~ increase in temperature with 
losses on the order of 1.3% to 2% of world GDP I. These 
research efforts will continue, but it is becoming increas- 
ingly clear that they will do so in the context of a growing 
list of careful analyses of market-based damages that 
suggest that earlier cost estimates for advanced econo- 
mies may be severely exaggerated. 
Yohe et al. [18], for example, recently reported that 
the likely transient opportunity cost of greenhouse 
induced sea level rise associated in the United States 
with a 2.5~ temperature increase by 2065 lies between 
$72 and $139 million along the now most likely 33 cm 
trajectory - an estimate that is roughly one-tenth the $1 
billion reported by, among others, Cline [1]. In light of 
See tables 1 through 4 of Chapter I0 in Weyant et al, [12] for a com- 
plete list of these models and some brief description of each entry. 
this and other studies, some researchers have begun to 
argue that estimates of market-based damages are fall- 
ing so fast that it is now difficult to see how they will sum 
ultimately to anything that is significantly greater than 
zero 2; and if this perception is accurate, then integrated 
assessment modelers will soon be forced to build the ben- 
efit side of their evaluation of mitigating policy options 
entirely from estimates ofnonmarket damages. 
The work reported here takes this insight at face 
value, but it also recognizes that valuation techniques 
for nonmarket damages are controversial and have not 
yet been applied widely to global change impacts. It also 
recognizes concerns raised by many researchers that the 
cost-benefit paradigm is ill-equipped to handle both the 
possibility of irreversible impacts and the intergenera- 
tional welfare comparisons that lie at the heart of their 
view of the global change problem. Rather than wait 
new techniques to emerge that buttress the paradigm 
and aid its application to global change, this work recog- 
nizes the real possibility that decisions about abatement 
policies may actually be founded on something other 
William Nordhaus, for example, argued this point before the Janu- 
ary 1995 meeting of the American Economic Association. Thomas 
Schelling has held this view for some time, and articulated it yet 
again during an intervention at the latest meeting of the Interna- 
tional Energy Workshop in Vienna in June of 1995. Results from 
an impacts analysis conducted for the United States with the sup- 
port of the Electric Power Research Institute will likely show sev- 
eral potentially positive effects when change is cast in light of a 
future that allows for adaptation. 
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than efficiency criteria of even an expanded cost-benefit 
calculus. It assumes, instead, 
(1) that significant nonmarket and/or irreversible 
impacts will be identified at a date certain in the 
future (taken to be the year 2020 in what follows), 
(2) that these impacts will be triggered when atmos- 
pheric concentrations of carbon dioxide cross a spe- 
cific threshold that is unknown at present but 
which will be revealed at the same future date (dis- 
tributed in this work between 550 and 850 ppm), 
and 
(3) that global decision-makers will decide for some 
reason that the revealed impact concentration 
threshold will not be crossed as a matter of policy 
regardless of cost. 
It should be emphasized from the start that highlighting 
concentration thresholds is not really what sets this 
work apart from earlier analyses. Limiting concentra- 
tion thresholds are offered simply to illustrate a sort of 
"single number fixation" from which policies frequently 
emerge and to emphasize that the critical policy thresh- 
old may or may not emerge from an efficiency driven 
economic perspective. Regardless of its source, that it 
might emerge and that its value is presently uncertain 
puts the question of deciding near term abatement strat- 
egy into a new context - one of hedging or buying insur- 
ance now against the excessive cost of reacting late to a 
future constraint that could be very binding. 
The hedging tradeoff to be explored is easily described 
when the representative focus on concentration thresh- 
olds is adopted. Policies would have to be crafted to 
reduce carbon emissions if a threshold were identified in 
the future, but the delay in its resolution does not neces- 
sarily relieve decision makers of the burden of making 
some sort of near term response to its possibility. The 
issue that faces them at the end of the 20th century is 
therefore one of what to do while the uncertainty is being 
resolved. Set early carbon taxes (e.g.) too high over the 
next 25 years, for example, and emissions will be overly 
restricted in the short term. Controls could be relaxed 
later, of course, but the resulting distant cost savings 
would not necessarily cover all of the near term expense. 
Set early taxes too low, however, and costly "catch-up" 
policies would be required in the next century. Present 
day decision makers must thus decide the degree to 
which interim emissions should be reduced so that the 
expected value of the discounted sum of control costs 
might be minimized. 
Economic efficiency will, therefore, not be ignored; 
it will, instead, be imposed upon the intertemporal 
design of policy so that inves tment  in meeting its target 
will have the smallest possible effect on the global econ- 
omy. The key word, here, is "investment". Since cost 
incurred in the near term is an "investment" designed to 
reduce the future cost of meeting a specified policy objec- 
tive, the potential social benefits of meeting that objec- 
tive are irrelevant. The relative efficacy of hedging with 
an abatement policy (given that the policy is not irrever- 
sible) should be judged in exactly the same way that any 
such investment project is evaluated under uncertainty 
- on the basis of the present value return (savings, in this 
case) of net cost and discounted at the real rate of return 
of private capital 3 
Since this is the debut of the Connecticut (YOHE) 
Model, many of its details are described briefly in the 
next section. Readers familiar with the integrated assess- 
ment literature will quickly see it as a marriage of the 
original Nordhaus-Yohe [10] probabilistic-scenario 
model with the more recent DICE model authored by 
Nordhaus [9] alone..Section 3 follows with not only a 
description of the sources of uncertainty built into the 
Connecticut Model, but also a description of seven 
representative scenarios that have been chosen to reflect 
its range of variability in carbon emission trajectories. 
Preliminary concentration limits and the associated near 
term carbon tax trajectories that solve the decision 
makers' immediate policy dilemma are identified for 
each representative scenario in section 4 before uncer- 
tainty over the range of emission scenarios is confronted 
in section 5. 
Despite a wide range of possible futures that spans 
current conventional wisdom and no presumed a priori 
information about which threshold will ultimately be 
chosen, section 5 reports a robust result for the specific 
short term hedging question posed here: the expected 
discounted value of long term control costs is minimized 
by imposing no tax (or small taxes) on carbon for the 
assumed 25 years that it will take to (1) pick the correct 
threshold and (2) identify the scenario that most accu- 
rately depicts the future. 
2 The Connecticut (YOHE) Model: an aggregate 
integrated model with energy 
World economic output in any year t [the standard 
GDP denoted here by X(t)] is taken to be functionally 
related to the capital stock [K(t)], the size of population 
[L(t)], and the consumption of fossil and nonfossil fuel 
[Ec (t) and En (t), respectively] according to 
x(  t) = f~( t )A ( t )K  ( t ) ~ { L(  t)d(') [bEc( t) c~ 
+ (1 - b)E.(t)~'](l-a(o)/~} l-7 , (2.1) 
so that the elasticity of substitution between fossil and 
nonfossil fuel [go.] is given by [1/(c~ - 1)]. The share of 
output devoted to paying labor will change over time so 
that equation (2.1) can be adjusted each year to approxi- 
mate a more general constant elasticity of substitution 
3 See, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck [2]. 
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production structure with a series of  evolving Cobb- 
Douglas schedules. More  specifically (see Yohe [15]), 
letting the share of output  devoted to labor vary over 
time according to 
d(t) = [(k2e(t)lql(q-I)] + 1] -I , 
with 
k2 = [(1 - m)/m]  [ll(q-')l , 
supports a general CES structure of  the form 
x = AK'r[mL q + (1 - rn)Eq] (I-7)/q . 
Of course, the initial share of  labor is 
d(O) = [(k2P(o)lq/(q-1)l + 1] -I . 
As a result, the effective elasticity of  substitution over 
time between labor [L(t)] and energy [ E ( t ) -  Ec(l) 
+En(t)], denoted crm., is given by [1/(q - 1)] even though 
the product ion structure for any one year has 
aEL = -- 1. Note,  in passing, that 
P(t)  =_ {[Pc(t)Ec(t) + (Pn(t)En(t)]/[Ec(t) + En(t)]} 
is the (weighted) average price of  energy given the prices 
of  fossil and nonfossil fuels [Pc(t) and Pn(t), respec- 
tively]. 
This underlying structure contributes to the stock of  
integrated assessment models in several ways. First, it 
allows the Connecticut  (YOHE) Model to expand the 
range of  uncertain driving variables by exhibiting a 
derived demand for two types of  energy defined in part 
by elasticities of  substitution which are not  constrained 
to equal unity. Equat ion (2.1) also allows uncertainty 
about  technological change in the supply of  energy to be 
brought  to bear directly upon input decisions even as it 
expands the set of  substitution possibilities vis-h-vis 
other aggregate models. Both of  these possibilities were 
identified as among the most  important  sources of  
uncertainty in Nordhaus-Yohe  [10], but neither has yet 
been explored fully in a completely integrated assess- 
ment context. 
Trajectories for populat ion [L(t)] and neutral techno- 
logical change [A (t)] are given exogenously by: 




l(l) = (1 - - rL ) l ( t - -  1) (2.2b) 
A(t)  = Aoe a(O' (2.3a) 
a(t) = (1 - ,Sa)a(t - 1). (2.3b) 
The capital stock at any point in time [K(t)] and the con- 
sumption of  fossil and nonfossil fuels lEe(t) and E~(t)] 
will be determined endogenously. The cost of  warming is 
given by fl(t). According to the Nordhaus  structure 
[8,9] adopted by Cline [1], 
fl(t) = [1 + A(t)] -I , (2.4) 
where 
A(t) = a[T(t)/3] ~ (2.5) 
is a function of  temperature at time t[T(t)] 4. It is f~(t) 
that is anchored to aggregate damages associated with 
the 2.5~ increase in global mean temperature that is 
usually attributed to a doubling of  concentrations. 
The price ofnonfossil  fuel is given by 
Pn(t) = Pno + Poe [h(t)+((t)lt , (2.6) 
with h(t) representing the rate of  technological change 
in the supply of  energy and ((t) reflecting the bias of  
technological change toward (or away from) nonfossil 
fuel. The price of  fossil fuel is similarly given over time 
by 




R(t)  = Z Ec(i) (2.8) 
i=l 
representing cumulative fossil fuel consumption through 
year (t - 1). In addition, 
"r(t) = "roz(t)e rt + Td(t)z(t) (2.9) 
summarizes a range of  the carbon tax policy options 
denominated in dollars per ton of  carbon emissions. In 
writing equation (2.9), z(t) is taken as the carbon content 
of  fossil fuel burned in year t. It is applied first to a tax 
anchor It0] to produce an emissions reduction shadow 
price that grows over time at a rate equal to an appropri- 
ate rate of  discount [r]. This first term uses the standard 
Hotelling result to reflect, from a demand side perspec- 
tive, an efficient allocation over time whenever cumula- 
tive emissions are to be constrained beyond the power of  
the second rd(t) term s. The carbon content factor is 
also applied in this second term, a term designed to mod- 
ify the Hotelling trajectory to accommodate  how the 
4 Other structures may be employed in lieu of equation (2.5) as 
more understanding of potential damages is generated. As it stands, 
now, the parameters a and 0 are determined by the estimated 
annual loss (in terms of percent of global GDP) that might be asso- 
ciated with an effective doubling of atmospheric carbon concentra- 
tions and some conjecture about how quickly those damages 
might be climbing at that (future) point in time. Cline [1] and Nord- 
haus [9] adopt a quadratic structure with doubling causing GDP 
to fall by 1.3 and a --- 0.013. Note, again, that this damage structure 
is not employed in the threshold analysis that follows. 
s Mantle et al. [7] consider two tax schemes which let an initial sha- 
dow price set for the year 1990 rise at a 5% rate of interest; their 
motivation is the same as the one which supports the scarcity rent 
interpretation of'r0 recorded here. 
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marginal damage associated with emissions might 
change over time. Taken together, the two parts of equa- 
tion (2.9) are constructed to weigh dynamic economic 
efficiency in the " d e m a n d "  for constrained carbon emis- 
sions over time with a dynamic portrait  of  their marginal 
damage and the shadow price of  meeting any additional 
constraint. 
To see that  equation (2.9) handles a wide range of pos- 
sibilities, note that  it could be used to model efficient 
allocation over time if rd(t) were framed to reflect how 
(people thought  that) the marginal damage of  carbon 
emissions might change over time along a specific, regu- 
lated scenario of  how the future might unfold. A con- 
stant rd(t) would be appropriate, for example, if the 
marginal damage of  carbon emissions were thought not 
to change over time; but rd(t) would not be constant if 
the marginal damage of  emissions were seen by most to 
climb over time as emissions feed into higher and higher 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Mean- 
while, note that  r0 = 0 unless the targeted constraint on 
cumulative emissions continued to be binding even along 
a trajectory regulated by rd(t) > 0; i.e., TO = 0 unless 
cumulative emissions are to be reduced beyond the level 
justified by the efficient reaction over time to rd(t). Such 
is nearly always the case when concentrations are to be 
limited below specified thresholds. 
Input decisions in any year conform to the neoclassi- 
cal fundamentals which set the marginal products inputs 
equal to their real, net input prices. Full employment 
over the very long term means that equation (2.2) always 
holds. Applying these fundamentals to capital, then 
g ( t )  = {[Tf~(t- l ) x ( t -  1)] / [ ( r+6)]} ,  (2.10) 
where 6 represents the applicable rate of  depreciation. 
Investment in any year t[l(t)] must now cover not only 
depreciation, but also any net investment required to 
bring K ( t -  1) up to the level K(t )  given in equation 
(2.10); i.e., 
z(t) = x ( t )  - K ( t  - 1) + 6 I C ( t  - 1) 
= K( t )  - (I - 6 ) K ( t -  1) (2.11) 
summarizes investment - the portion of GDP devoted 
each year to maintaining the appropriate capital stock 6. 
Applying the same marginal product rules to energy, 
En(t) = {[(1 - 7 - d(t)  - a)f~(t  - 1)x(t - 1)]/[Pn(t)]} 
(2.12) 
and 
Ec(t) = {[aPn(t)]/[(1 - 7 - d( t )  - a)Pc(t)]}E~(t)  
= { [a f~( t -  1 ) x ( t -  1)]/[Pc(t)]} (2.13) 
characterize the derived demands for energy consistent 
with the production schedule given in equation (2.1). 
Following the usual convention of  imposing the sav- 
ings equals investment conditions for macroeconomic 
equilibrium, per capita consumption [c(t)] is 
c(t) ~ [f~(t)X(t) - I ( t ) ] / L ( t ) .  (2.14) 
Per capita consumption is known because equations 
(2.2), (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) combine with equation 
(2.1) to set GDP [X(t)] and equation (2.1 1) sets invest- 
ment [I(t)]. Assuming that utility displays constant  rela- 
tive risk aversion [denoted by 77] in per capita 
consumption, then 
U(c( t) ) = [c( t)o+l]/[rl + I], 
and the de facto optimization envisioned in the construc- 
tion of  the optimal policy seeks to maximize the dis- 
counted sum of  U(c(t)) .  
The damage side of the model is driven by emissions. 
Following the DICE construction, 
r ( t )  = z ( t )Ec( t ) ,  (2.15a) 
where 
and 
z(t)  = (1 + g z ( t ) ) z ( t -  1) (2.15b) 
gz(t) ----- (1 - 6z)gz(t - 1). (2.15c) 
Emissions are converted into atmospheric carbon con- 
centrations [M(t)] by 
M ( t )  =/3I '( t)  + (1 - 6 M ) M ( t  -- 1). (2.16) 
In writing equation (2.16), parameter/3 is the instanta- 
neous airborne fraction for carbon and 6M reflects a see- 
page factor. The DICE accommodation of  the 
Schneider forcing model completes the portrait. Forcing 
[F(t)] is, more specifically, represented by 
F( t )  = 4.1 { [ l o g ( M ( t ) / 5 9 0 ) ] / l o g ( 2 ) )  + O( t ) ,  (2.17) 
where O(t) represents other forces; they are, for the 
moment,  taken to be exogenous. The temperature index 
[T(t)] upon which damages depend in equation (2.5) is 
related finally to forcing through the now standard two 
equation simplification of complex global climate 
models: 
T( t )  = T ( t -  I) + {F(t) - AT( t  - 1) 
- ( R 2 / T q 2 ) [ T ( t -  I) - T * ( t -  1)])/R, (2.18) 
and 
T*(t) = T * ( t -  1) + { T ( t -  1) - T * ( t -  1)}/7-,2, 
(2.19) 
where the T* (t) variable reflects ocean temperature 7. 
Equality of savings and investment is implicit in this construction. 
so care needs to be taken in practice to see that equations (2.10) and 
(2.11) do not lead to unreasonable changes in savings rates. 
7 The damage component of the model parallels exactly the structure 
employed by Nordhaus in the DICE Model [9]. 
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Sources o f  unce r t a in ty -  parameter  location and specification. 
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Description Location Specification Likelihood 
(1) a Populat ion Equation(2.2b) l(t) = (0.873)1(t-  I) 0.25 H 
I(t) = (0 .805) l ( t -  1) 0.50 M 
I(t) = (0 .732) l ( t -  I) 0.25 L 
(2) b Technologica lchange  Equations (2.6) h(t) = 0.01 0.25 H 
in energy supply and (2.7) h(t) = 0.0 0.50 M 
h(t) = -0.01 0.25 L 
(3) c Depletion factor in Equation (2.7) gt = 145 & R  = 21 0.25 H 
fossil fuel price gl = 687 & R = 21 0.50 M 
gl = 1230&R = 21 0.25 L 
(4) d Interfuel elasticity of  Equation(2.1) tr = - 0 . 4 & a  = -1 .50  0.25 L 
subst i tut ion [acn] tr = -0 .7  & a = -0 .43  0.50 M 
a =  - l . 2 & a  = 0.17 0.25 H 
(5) General  technological Equation(2.3b) a(t) = (0.89)a(t - 1) median 
change 
(6) Carbon  content  factor Equat ion (2.15) 
(7) b Technological  bias Equat ion (2.6) 
toward  fossil fuel 
(8) g Energy / l abor  elasticity Equation(2.1) 
of  subst i tu t ion [aeL] 
(9) h Marg ina la i rborne  Equation(2.16) 
fraction 
g(t) = ( l . 0 3 9 ) g ( t -  I) median 
~(t) = 0.0 median 
a = - 1.2 median 
/~ = 0.64 median 
a Growth  rates per decade begining in 1990 with 5.16 billion people and based on an initial annual  growth rate of  2.03~ source: Nordhaus  and 
Yohe [10] and N o r d h a u s  [9]. 
b Rate  o fchange  per year; source: Nordhaus  and Yohe [10]. 
c Reflection ofdeplet ion of  the high resource est imate in Nordbaus  and Yohe [10] fit to reflect the 1993 IEW poll results. 
d Measure  of  the percentage change in fuel mix (fossil to nonfossil) associated with each 1 percent change in relative energy prices; source: Nord-  
haus and  Yohe [ 10]. 
e Rate  of  change per decade beginning in 1990 with a unitless calibrating value of  483 and based on an initial annual  growth rate ~  1.85%; s~ 
Nordhaus  and  Yohe [10] and Nordhaus  [9]. 
f Carbon  emission per metric ton ofcoal  equivalent with an initial value of  0.688; source: Nordhaus  [9]. 
g Measure•f thepercentagechangeinenergyc•nsumpti•ninpr•p•r t i •nt••ab•remp••ymentass•cia tedwitheach I percent change in the rela- 
tive price of  energy with respect to the wage paid to labor; source: Nordhaus  and Yohe [10]. 
h Source: Nordhaus  and Yohe [10] and  Nordhaus  [9]. 
3 Identification o f  representative scenarios 
Table 1 highlights nine uncertain parameters over which 
preliminary Monte Carlo simulation was conducted 
and indicates the sources of their initial distributions. In 
each case, high, middle and low values were assigned 
subjective probabilities of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.25, respec- 
tively. Subsequent modeling focused on the four param- 
eters that contributed most to the range of estimates of 
emissions through to 2100; the full set of values for these 
are recorded first s. Median values only are noted for 
the other five. These medians combined with the baseline 
parameteri'zations of equations (2.15) through (2.19) 
from DICE to solidify the foundation for an exhaustive, 
probabilistically weighted sampling over the other four 
that adequately reflected the initial Monte Carlo out- 
comes of 500 randomly selected scenarios drawn from 
the larger set of 39 possible combinations. 
The resulting 81 scenarios were ranked in order of 
Note  tha t  technological change in energy [h(t)] and the elasticity of  
subst i tu t ion between fossil and  nonfossil  fuel against  energy, as in 
the original Nordhaus -Yohe  [10] work, is among  the mos t  signifi- 
cant  sources of  uncertainty.  
emissions (in 2100) and partitioned into seven groups. 
Following a methodology for selecting "interesting" 
scenarios described in Yohe [16], these partitions were 
defined and representative scenarios were selected in a 
way that minimized the probabilistically weighted sum 
of the squared errors in emissions (again, in 2100) 
involved in describing the entire distribution by a collec- 
tion of only seven trajectories 9. Figures 1 and 2 portray 
the selected emissions and concentration paths of sce- 
narios (1), (3) [the median trajectory] and (7) graphi- 
9 The procedure that  leads to the selection o f  seven representative tra- 
jectories also creates a specific part i t ion of  all possible trajectories 
- parti t ions that  were also defined by the minimizing procedure. 
The procedure starts  with an arbitrary part i t ioning for which error 
minimizing representatives were chosen. In the next  step, the high- 
est member  of  the lowest parti t ion was moved to the next  highest 
partition and the calculations redone. If the sum of  squared errors 
fell, then another  member  was moved up; if not, then it was 
returned to the lowest partition. This  trial and error method  was 
applied to all of  the partit ion boundaries  until no more  error reduc- 
ing moves were available. There are theorems tha t  describe when 
this procedure converges to a unique outcome. Their  condit ions 
appear to have been met  by the collection of  81 emissions values, 
but  confidence can be placed on the fact tha t  s tart ing from different 
initial parti t ions and  working from both  the bo t tom up and the 
top down produced the same results. 
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Figure 1. Representative emission trajectories. 
cally, and table 2 identifies the underlying specifications 
of all seven alternatives. The probabilities noted in col- 
umn (1) are the sum of the likelihood weights of all of the 
scenarios housed in the indicated partition. 
Since the scenarios described in table 2 emerged 
from a process that artificially collapsed a potential of 39 
runs from one specific model into a manageable set of 
scenarios deemed representative and "interesting", it is 
reasonable to question the degree to which they reflect 
anything more than the idiosyncracies of the model, the 
selection process, or both. Table 3 performs the danger- 
ous task of comparing these seven scenarios, expressed 
in terms of both carbon emissions and carbon dioxide 
concentrations, to several other ranges. It is comforting 
to note that the seven representative scenarios chosen 
here do reasonably well in reflecting the diversity of 
expert opinion. They fully span the emissions recorded 
by the IPCC in its six specified scenarios; indeed, 
approximately 20% of the likelihood range reported here 
exceeds the highest IPCC emission trajectory (IS92e). 
The seven selected here lie between the 10th and 90th 
percentile DICE results in both emissions and concen- 
trations, but they show much more potential on the 
"high side" than the preliminary "modeler's choice" 
sample from EMF-14 10. 
There are two other issues of idiosyncracy that can 
also be explored by comparing results obtained here 
with those of other modelers. The first concerns the very 
aggregate nature of the model. Given, particularly, the 
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Figure 2. Representative concentration scenarios. 
Table 2 
Specification of representative scenarios. 
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Scenario Subjective Population Technological Depletion Substitution 
likelihood growth change elasticity 
(1) 0.27 H H L H 
(2) 0.13 H M M H 
(3) 0.23 H L H H 
(4) 0.19 M M L M 
(5) 0.09 L L H L 
(6) 0.05 H L M L 
(7) 0.04 H L L L 
consolidation of all types of fossil fuel into one variable 
whose price is driven by equation (2.7), what can be said 
about the degree to which the costs reflected here con- 
form to costs that might be captured more accurately by 
models that contain more detail in their energy compo- 
nents? Put another way, how much is lost with the 
smooth price trajectory dictated by equation (2.7) when 
the world price will certainly ratchet up a "stair-step" 
trajectory as relatively scarce fuel-types give way to rela- 
tively abundant alternatives? 
Results from the median trajectory [scenario (3)] 
have been reported to the EMF-14 exercise, so compari- 
sons are possible for a number of critical statistics along 
Table 3 
Selected results-  comparisons with conventional wisdom a. 
controlled paths designed to limit atmospheric concen- 
trations to 550 ppm - a particularly good place to focus 
since this paper ultimately worries about limiting con- 
centrations anywhere from 550 ppm through 850 
ppm it. The carbon tax trajectory derived for scenario 
(3), for example, tracks the path quoted in the second 
round EMF-14 report from MERGE very well through 
to 2040, but then takes a lower route until they again 
coincide in 2100. Close coincidence with the reported 
CETA tax portrait holds through to 2060; and through 
tl See, again, the graphical reports of EMF-14 preliminary results in 
Weyant [11,12]. 
Emissions in 2100 Concentrations in 2100 
(A) Representative scenarios 
Median inputs 20.2 679 
Scenario (1) 7.8 502 
Scenario (2) 15.6 615 
Scenario (3) 20.2 679 
Scenario (4) 28.7 785 
Scenario (5) 43.4 972 
Scenario (6) 48.9 1044 





Scenario IS92c 4.6 n/a 
Scenario IS92d 9.9 n/a 
Scenario IS92b 18.6 n/a 
Scenario IS92a 19.8 n/a 
Scenario IS92f 25.9 n/a 
Scenario IS92e 34.9 n /a  
DICE b 
Tenth percentile 6.4 465 
Median trajectory 24.1 671 
Ninetieth percentile 82.5 1203 
Energy Modeling Forum - 14 
Modeler's choice (low) 
Modeler's choice (high) 
Standardized reference (low) 





a Emissions are given in billions ofmetric tons of carbon; concentration is parts per million volume. 
b Values reported for 2095, actually, in table 7.3 of Nordhaus [9]. 
c Values estimated from graphical presentations of First Round EMF-14 results. 
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to 2100 against the results of the highly disaggregated 
MIT model. Estimates of a second statistic defined to 
quantify the cost of abatement generally fell near the 
middle of first round EMF-14 citations through to 2100 
(after they begin to diverge in roughly 2040). Indeed, by 
the year 2100, the estimate of global control costs of 
$3740 billion derived from scenario (3) lies squarely in 
the middle of a range reported to EMF-14 that runs from 
more than $7000 billion from CETA on the high side 
down to PAGE's roughly $1000 billion on the low side. 
Finally, discounting the loss in world GDP associated 
with restricting concentrations along scenario (3) to 550 
ppm 5% produces an estimate of approximately $19 tril- 
lion - a value that closely matches results of a similar dis- 
counting procedure produced from MERGE 12 
The second area of concern about the specifics of the 
model is derived from its simplistic treatment of the car- 
bon cycle. Equations (2.16) through (2.19) capture that 
treatment; and they have been drawn directly from the 
DICE formulation. Other simple representations exist 
(see, e.g., Maler-Reimer and Hasselmann [5]) and have 
been employed by other researchers to investigate issues 
of timing, among other things (see, e.g., Wigley et al. 
[14]); and many feel that these representations produce 
more credible portraits of targeted emissions and con- 
centration trajectories because they more closely 
approximate the complexities of the underlying science. 
These concerns are well founded, of course, but comfort 
can be taken in observing that the targeted emissions 
and concentration trajectories reported here look much 
more like trajectories produced by Wigley et al. than 
they do the more suspect IPCC trajectories. This point 
can be supported by again focusing on scenario (3) - this 
time because it tracks IPCC BaU emissions scenario 
(IS92a) quite closely. In restricting concentrations to no 
more than 550 ppm from the IS92a baseline, the IPCC 
reports concentrations of 450 ppm and 525 ppm for 2050 
and 2100, respectively. Wigley and his colleagues show 
that emissions can rise more quickly in the near term 
even when a 550 ppm threshold is imposed and report 
concentrations of approximately 480 ppm and 530 ppm 
for the same dates 13. Meanwhile, the work produced 
here will show coincident concentrations of 470 ppm and 
540 ppm along the restricted scenario (3) trajectory. 
The match is not exact, but the proximity suggests that 
using the more dated carbon-cycle representation of the 
DICE framework is not too expensive. 
Comparison with even a full set of alternative scenar- 
ios would not constitute validation of these scenarios, 
to be sure. There is, nonetheless, some convincing evi- 
dence that the seven scenarios described in table 2 do, 
indeed, adequately span the range of current opinion 
about what the future might hold and that their underly- 
t2 See Manne  et  al .  [7]. 
t3 Approximate  figures read from figure 1 in Wigley et al. [14]. 
ing structure does not produce anomalous cost or con- 
centration statistics. 
4 Limiting concentrations for representative 
scenarios 
Equation (2.9) provides the analytical means with which 
to reduce emissions by taxing carbon along any scenario 
so that concentrations converge on any prescribed limit 
from below. If the given limit cannot be determined until 
sometime in the future, however, policies that must be 
imposed prior to that time can be too strict or too lenient, 
depending upon the limit that is ultimately identified. 
Excessively stringent early taxes increase near term con- 
trol costs even though they reduce costs in the more dis- 
tant future; and early taxes that turn out to be too lenient 
impose smaller near term losses at the expense of exces- 
sive downstream costs. Either type of error can be costly, 
therefore, even considering long term adjustments, and 
so the immediate policy decision involved in setting 
short term emissions taxes is really determined by mini- 
mizing the expected present value of total costs com- 
puted to include the excess cost attributable to either 
type of error in all states ofnature. 
To see exactly what is involved in this minimization, 
let the stream of taxes designed to hold concentrations 
below threshold i along scenario j be given by {j'rik(1)} 
when the appropriate limit turns out to be threshold k. 
Meanwhile, let the discounted value of the control cost 
associated with each tax be {jCik}. These statistics can be 
expressed as the sum of the usual (discounted) dead 
weight loss triangles 14. If the present view of the likeli- 
hood that threshold k will be prescribed were 7rk, then 
E{jCi} =- y~ TrkjCik (4.1) 
k 
would be the expected cost of setting initial taxes tar- 
geted at achieving threshold i along scenarioj. 
Table 4 records the results of an experiment that 
explores the ramifications of equation (4.1) along the 
seven scenarios identified in section 3 for a 3% discount 
rate. It was produced assuming that the correct concen- 
tration limit will be one of seven possible choices (550 
ppm, 600 ppm, ... ,  850 ppm). Each was thought to be 
equally likely in 1995 but it is assumed that the true and 
actual target will be found among them and announced 
in the year 2020. The question is thus one of determining 
what series of taxes from 1995 through 2020 minimizes 
E{jCi} along each scenario assuming precise, cost-mini- 
mizing mid course corrections in the tax series in the 
year 202015 
t4 See chapter 4 in Nordhaus  [9] for a complete description of  these 
deadweight loss measures. 
is The runs were all initialized to 1990, but policies were invoked in 
1995. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics for equally likely concentration thresholds. The expected present cost of control through 2200 a. 
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Assumed Scenario number 
threshold 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
550 0.00 0.77 2.33 5.69 22.39 26.17 33.31 
600 0.00 0.77 2.15 5.66 21.74 25.54 32.77 
650 0.00 0.77 2.07 5.66 21.46 25.28 32.52 
700 0.00 0.76 2.02 5.64 21.31 25.18 32.49" 
750 0.00 0.67 2.00 5.64 21.25 25.17 32.60 
800 0.00 0.67 1.98 5.64 21.22 25.16 ~ 32.65 
850 0.00 ~ 0.67" 1.97 ~ 5.64" 21.21 ~ 25.18 32.69 
These are the E{I CI} of equation (4.1). They are denominated in percent of world GNP in 1990; one percentage point is approximately $210 
billion. 
The statistics presented in table 4 actually report 
expected costs through to 2200 as a percentage of 1990 
world GDP (1 point is approximately $210 billion)16. 
The starred values highlight the smallest expected costs. 
They suggest that setting taxes with the expectation that 
850 ppm will turn out to be correct minimizes expected 
costs for scenarios (1) through (5). Scenario (6) supports 
800 ppm as the best target; and scenario (7), 700 ppm. 
High emission trajectories can lead to high initial taxes 
targeted at intermediate concentration thresholds, but 
the conclusion that shooting for the least restrictive 850 
ppm target is remarkably robust. Table 5 records the 
appropriate taxes for representative years between 1995 
and 2020 - taxes associated with the expected cost mini- 
mizing threshold targets just identified. 
5 Limiting concentrations with uncertain scenarios 
Concentration targets are not the only source of uncer- 
tainty facing the global policy community. Global deci- 
~6 Comparisons of the transient control costs that support the statis- 
tics recorded in table 4 show that more than eighty percent of the 
probability (scenarios (1) through (4)) span the costs recorded in the 
First Round of EMF-14. Preliminary results reported in Round 2 
capture the costs associated with scenarios, 5) and (6), as well. 
Table 5 
Expected cost minimizing taxes for representative scenarios a. 
Scenario Best target Carbon tax for selected years 
1995 2000 2010 
(1) 850 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(2) 850 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(3) 850 0.05 1.00 4.35 
(4) 850 0.64 1.79 5.34 
(5) 850 8.15 11.90 19.00 
(6) 800 I 1.70 16.67 25.48 
(7) 700 22.94 31.88 45.99 
a Taxes here are identified for selected years between 1995 and 2020 
that are defined as the beginning tax trajectories designed to meet the 
indicated best target along the identified scenario; thresholds are as- 
sumed to be equally likely. 
sion makers now have least (expected) cost tax trajec- 
tories for each scenario through to 2020, but they are still 
unsure about which scenario will most closely represent 
the future. As a result, they still face a set of "too high 
versus too low" errors within which to weigh an ultimate 
decision. A little more notation can sort through the 
combinations and permutations that emerge even given 
the enormous simplification of table 5. 
Assume, now, that all uncertainty will be resolved in 
2020; i.e., suppose that the appropriate concentration 
limit and the actual future scenario will be determined by 
2020. Let (flrik (t)} represent the series of taxes that mini- 
mizes the present value of control cost if: 
(1) scenarioj were anticipated in 1995, 
(2) scenario l were determined to be most representa- 
tive in 2020, 
(3) taxes associated in table 5 with scenario j and tar- 
geted at limit i were imposed through 2020, and 
(4) limit k turned out to be correct. 
There would, with such a series, be a control cost series 
whose present value is now represented by {jl Cik }. Recal- 
ling that 7rj represents the likelihood (viewed in 1995) 
that limitj will emerge as the most appropriate, let ~ be 
the likelihood (viewed in 1990) that scenario l will turn 
out to be the most representative. Based upon the Monte 
Carlo results that support this analysis, the appropriate 
7d are given in the first column of table 2. 
The expected value of choosing the initial taxes from 
table 5 that are targeted at threshold i (anticipating sce- 
nario j) can now be expressed as 
Table 6 shows the results of these calculations (again 
control costs through to 2200 based on deadweight loss 
triangles and again expressed in terms of percentage 
points of 1990 world GDP). The first seven columns 
show the terms in the right hand sign bracket for each 
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Table 6 
Summary statistics for equally likely concentration thresholds. The expected cost of scenario defined control through 2200 with scenarios weighted 
by modeling results a 
Initial Expected costs across scenarios by target Expected 
target and value 
defining (550) (600) (650) (700) (750) (800) (850) 
trajectory 
850(1&2) 16.51 12.99 5.94 4.02 2.84 2.42 1.59 6.62* 
850 (3) 16.40 12.96 6.07 4.17 3.02 2.61 1.79 6.72 
850(4) 16.69 13.16 6.10 4.20 3.06 2.65 1.82 6.81 
850(5) 16.50 13.15 6.45 4.61 3.49 3.08 2.27 7.08 
800 (6) 16.43 13.16 6.61 4.79 3.68 3.28 2.47 7.20 
850 (7) 16.40 13.30 7.09 5.32 4.24 3.84 3.05 7.61 
a The seven columns are the )-'~.~{/tC~k} of equation (4.2). The last column records the resulting complete E{jtCik}. They are all denominated in 
percent of world GNP in 1990; one percentage point is approximately $210 billion. 
limit and ant ic ipated scenario ( through 2020) for the 
of  table 2. The last column records the corresponding 
expected values given a uni form prior  across prospective 
limits. 
The remarkab le  result is that  planning for 850 ppm 
by imposing the zero taxes associated with scenarios (I)  
and (2) minimizes the expected present  value of  control  
cost; i.e., the costs o f  over-react ing early always domi-  
nate even when there is no benefit side to consider. These 
are costs o f  meet ing non-economically  imposed and 
nonetheless  binding thresholds; and so the result is not  
driven by  a low benefit  side. Indeed, the benefit side is a 
policy imperat ive  - a concentra t ion s tandard with what-  
ever shadow price is required to make  it stick. 
Table  7 examines the gross sensitivity of  these conclu- 
sions to changes in the weighting of  the representative 
scenarios. The values recorded there were computed  
under  the assumpt ion  that  all o f  the scenarios were 
equally likely. The  effect o f  this assumpt ion  is to move  
21 points of  l ikelihood f rom below scenario (4) to above 
scenario (4) and to increase the likelihood of  scenarios 
(6) and (7) by factors  of  3. The procedure  is dramatic ,  
placing more  than 45% of  likelihood above highest 
IPCC scenario. The least (expected) cost choice is now to 
target  850 p p m  under  the presumpt ion  that  scenario (3) 
will turn out to be mos t  descriptive of  the future. This is a 
change in policy peispective, to be sure, but  the early 
taxes still only climb f rom $0.05 in 1990 to $4.35 in 2010 
- r emarkab ly  modest  taxes under severely distorted 
assumptions.  
6 C o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s  
The specific analysis reported here shows that  little or 
no emissions reduction is warran ted  over  the near  term 
even as a hedge against  the possibility of  having to meet  
severely binding concentrat ion limits somet ime in the 
not too distant future. This is a striking result, given the 
enormous  uncertainty reflected here in both  the future 
pa th  of  carbon emissions and the range of  possible con- 
centrat ion limits. The specifics are not to be believed, o f  
course. They depend critically upon the model  offered. It  
is an aggregate model,  so it misses much  detail whose 
inclusion might  have changed some of  the numbers.  
Compar i son  with the results o f  more  detailed models 
suggests, however,  that  the quali tat ive conclusions 
should not be too suspect in this regard. The model  also 
depends upon a specific and simplified representat ion of  
the carbon cycle that  might  also be the source of  some 
concern. Again, compar ison  suggests that  the errors  are 
not too large, especially in the near  term (the real focus 
Table 7 
Summary statistics for equally likely concentration thresholds. The expected cost of scenario defined control through 2200 with equally weighted 
scenarios a 
Initial Expected costs across scenarios by target Expected 
target and value 
defining (550) (600) (650) (700) (750) (800) (850) 
trajectory 
850 (l& 2) 31.43 25.21 12.76 8.94 6.49 5.57 3.74 13.45 
850 (3) 31.24 25. I0 12.83 9.03 6.63 5.38 2.89 13.30" 
850 (4) 31.55 25.32 12.85 9.06 6.66 5.75 3.92 13.59 
850 (5) 31.14 25. I I 13.06 9.35 6.99 6.09 4.30 13.72 
800 (6) 30.97 25.04 13.17 9.49 7.15 6.26 4.47 13.79 
850 (7) 30.69 24.96 13.49 9.91 7.61 6.73 4.97 14.05 
a The seven columns are the ~'~ ~{jt Cik } of equation (4.2). The last column records the resulting complete E{./t Ctk }. They are all denominated in 
percent of world GNP in 1990; one percentage point is approximately $210 billion. 
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of the work); in fact, moving to alternative carbon cycle 
representations that support higher emissions early 
would underscore the qualitative conclusions offered 
here that only modest intervention is appropriate over 
that near term. 
It must be emphatically noted that this qualitative 
conclusion is not derived from the usual cost-benefit 
paradigm where low market-based damages, vague non- 
market damages, and the unrecognized potential of sig- 
nificant irreversible results undermine the need for 
strong and immediate emission controls. In fact, the 
imposition of nonmarket criteria for avoiding a signifi- 
cant impact of global change was taken to be clear, 
decisive, unquestioned; indeed, it was drawn from out- 
side the economic paradigm. All that the analysis asked 
of the economic analysis was that the path to be chosen 
to avoid the potential impact be as cost-effective as 
possible. 
The work reported here certainly begs the question 
of when and whether the modeled scientific certainty 
might emerge. A twenty-five year time frame has been 
imposed, but what if it were longer? The results reported 
in tables 6 and 7 are so robust that it is difficult to tell a 
story that might explain why extended uncertainty might 
alter near term policy; but the growing divergence of 
concentration trajectories beyond 2020 offers the sug- 
gestion that tradeoffs cast between limiting concentra- 
tion thresholds and across alternative emissions 
scenarios would cut more deeply in (e.g.) a learning per- 
iod between 2020 and 2045 or 2050. Even as this hypoth- 
esis is explored, though, a qualitative message of near 
term response can be offered. Fundamental research 
into both the concentration thresholds of serious poten- 
tial impacts (or some other observable metric of change 
that might signal those impacts) and the likely trajec- 
tories of emissions and concentrations could pay sub- 
stantial dividends. The first defines a broad agenda of 
natural scientific issues. The latter identifies a social 
science agenda and highlights several critical foci: tech- 
nological change in the supply of energy, the ability to 
substitute nonfossil fuels for fossil fuels, population and 
its distribution across the globe, and the degree to which 
depletion of fossil fuels is reflected in its real price. It 
would appear that global decision makers could honestly 
buy themselves some time if they chose to pursue both 
with some directed intensity. 
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